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THE FLSA PERMISSION SLIP:
DETERMINING WHETHER FLSA SETTLEMENTS
AND VOLUNTARY DISMISSALS
REQUIRE APPROVAL
Alex Lau*
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) seeks to protect the poorest,
most vulnerable workers by requiring that they be paid a minimum wage and
compensated for their overtime labor. When employers do not pay their
workers minimum wage or overtime compensation and thereby violate the
FLSA, workers have the power to sue their employers for remuneration. Like
many other types of cases, most FLSA cases settle before going to trial.
Unlike those other types of cases, however, most courts have held that
settlements of FLSA cases must be approved to be enforceable. Even though
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 generally allows parties to settle lawsuits
by voluntarily dismissing their lawsuits without approval, these courts have
held that the FLSA should be an exception to Rule 41. Some courts, however,
have held that settlements of FLSA cases should not require approval to be
enforceable.
This Note addresses and analyzes the differences between these
approaches. It seeks to balance the protection the FLSA intends to provide
workers and the ability of parties to freely settle disputes embodied in Rule
41. To strike this balance, this Note suggests that settlements of lawsuits
brought under the FLSA should not require approval, because the Act should
be subject to and not exempt from Rule 41. However, settlements of causes
of action arising under the FLSA should require approval to ensure the
necessary protection the Act was meant to provide to the workers it serves.
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INTRODUCTION
A Department of Labor (DOL) investigation leads to a finding that a
grocery store has violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and owes its
employees more than $10,000 in back wages.1 After the employer is
unsuccessful in negotiating a settlement with the DOL, it works to settle
quickly and inexpensively with its employees.2 The employer goes to the
employees directly and offers them $1000 to be split among those who agree
to settle the claims.3 The employer and its representative imply that the
employees are not entitled to the money they would get from the settlement,
tell them that they do not deserve the money, and fight back against concerns
from employees about their pay.4 Fourteen employees sign the agreement.5
Some of these employees do not speak English and none of them consult an
attorney or seem to know about the DOL’s finding.6 The employer then
brings a declaratory judgment action to have the settlement judicially
approved.7 This Note explores whether such settlements must be supervised
or approved by a court or the DOL.
The grocery store workers described above represent the type of workers
the FLSA seeks to protect: vulnerable, impoverished, and uninformed. Some
of these workers are afraid to bring lawsuits or go to trial for fear of retaliation
at work, or worse, losing their jobs.8 For all of those risks, there is not much
reward. Many FLSA cases are not worth enough for individual plaintiffs to
go to trial, and they end up settling for meager amounts.9
1. See Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir. 1982).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id. at 1354–55.
5. See id. at 1352.
6. See id. at 1354.
7. See id. at 1351–52.
8. Andrew C. Brunsden, Hybrid Class Actions, Dual Certification, and Wage Law
Enforcement in the Federal Courts, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 269, 296–97 (2008);
Janice Harper, What to Expect If You Sue Your Employer, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 11, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/janice-harper/what-to-expect-when-you-s_b_1194955.html
[https://perma.cc/BBL3-4C9P].
9. See Picerni v. Bilingual Seit & Preschool Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 368, 377 (E.D.N.Y.
2013). Since 2007, the mean settlement value per plaintiff in FLSA cases has been $5472,
while the median settlement value per plaintiff during that time is even lower, at just $2576.
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Because many employees are afraid to bring lawsuits, and those who do
are incentivized to settle, there is little reason for employers who violate the
FLSA to discontinue their unlawful practices. On the off chance they get
caught, they will likely be able to settle for a small amount. Further,
settlement agreements of FLSA claims often include confidentiality
provisions and require employees to agree to waive any other existing claims
they may have against the employer.10 Confidentiality provisions stymie
additional claims by keeping workers from learning about suits. The waiver
of claims prevents workers who bring suit from bringing other possibly
legitimate claims against their employers. These types of provisions in
settlement agreements allow employers to continue to take advantage of their
workers.
The concern over unfair settlements has led some courts to require
settlements of FLSA causes of action and voluntary dismissals of FLSA
lawsuits under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 to be approved by a court
or the DOL.11 The rationale behind an approval requirement is that it keeps
predatory employers from taking advantage of vulnerable employees in
unfair settlement agreements.12 Approval requirements not only ensure that
individual workers are not taken advantage of, but also that workers as a
whole are protected.13 Such requirements thereby bolster the threat and
consequences for those employers that do violate the FLSA.14 They also give
employees extra bargaining power in a relationship where their power is
usually lacking.15
Some courts have been resistant to an approval requirement. They reason
that private settlements should be respected.16 They hold that an approval
requirement is not practical because most FLSA cases are not worth enough
for either party to take further action if a settlement is not approved.17 These
courts recognize the balancing act between protecting workers as a whole and
protecting individual employee-plaintiffs who may not have the resources to
See Stephanie Plancich, Neil Fanaroff & Janeen McIntosh, Trends in Wage and Hour
Settlements:
2015 Update, NERA ECON. CONSULTING 7 (July 14, 2015),
http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2015/PUB_Wage_and_Hour_Settlemen
ts_0715.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Y8H-25UA].
10. Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199, 206 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing
Lopez v. Nights of Cabiria, LLC, No. 14-cv-1274, 2015 WL 1455689, at *1–7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
30, 2015)).
11. See, e.g., id.; Lynn’s Food, 679 F.2d at 1352–53, 1355.
12. Cheeks, 796 F.3d at 203 (citing Lynn’s Food, 679 F.2d at 1352).
13. Elizabeth Wilkins, Silent Workers, Disappearing Rights: Confidential Settlements
and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 34 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 109, 133–34 (2013) (stating
that even though the court’s first consideration in approving FLSA settlements should be
whether the settlement is fair to the employee-plaintiff, the court also needs to consider
whether such a settlement would help keep similar situations from happening to other
workers).
14. See Cheeks, 796 F.3d at 207.
15. See id.
16. See Martin v. Spring Break ’83 Prods., 688 F.3d 247, 255 (5th Cir. 2012); Martinez v.
Bohls Bearing Equip. Co., 361 F. Supp. 2d 608, 631 (W.D. Tex. 2005).
17. See Picerni v. Bilingual Seit & Preschool Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 368, 377 (E.D.N.Y.
2013).
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continue to litigate if their settlement agreements are not approved. Even
though an approval requirement may help to ensure the overall protection of
vulnerable workers from unscrupulous employers, that may be of little
assurance to the non-English-speaking grocery store employee whose case is
not worth much and who needs money.18
This Note will discuss whether settlements of FLSA causes of action and
lawsuits should have to be approved by a court or the DOL to be enforceable.
This Note uses the term “cause(s) of action” to refer to facts that would enable
a person to bring a lawsuit, while the terms “lawsuit(s)” and “action(s)” refer
to an actual lawsuit that has been initiated based on a cause of action.
Part I provides an overview of the statutes and rules involved in the issue
of requiring approval of FLSA settlements. Part I.A discusses the FLSA, its
legislative history, amendments, and relevant case law interpretations. Part
I.B discusses Rule 41, which governs voluntary dismissals in federal
lawsuits. This part analyzes Rule 41’s history and discusses the statutes and
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that are exceptions to Rule 41. Part I.C
discusses other relevant federal employment statutes, such as Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”),19 the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),20 and the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA).21 This Part discusses whether settlements and voluntary dismissals
under these acts should be treated differently from those under the FLSA.
Part II discusses how courts have analyzed whether private settlements of
FLSA causes of action and voluntary dismissals of FLSA lawsuits should
require court or DOL approval to be enforceable. Parts II.A and II.B analyze
the circuit split between the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits over whether private
settlements of FLSA claims must be approved by a court or the DOL to be
enforceable. Parts II.C and II.D discuss a Second Circuit case and an Eastern
District of New York case that differ over whether voluntary dismissals of
FLSA lawsuits must be approved by a court or the DOL to be enforceable.
Part III argues that private settlements of FLSA causes of action should
require DOL or court approval to be enforceable but that settlements and
voluntary dismissals of FLSA lawsuits should not require DOL or court
approval to be enforceable. Part III.A discusses how the Second CircuitEastern District of New York discrepancy mirrors the Eleventh Circuit-Fifth
Circuit split. Part III.B discusses why the FLSA is not an applicable federal
statute under Rule 41. Part III.C explains why parties should be able to
voluntarily dismiss and settle lawsuits brought under the FLSA without court
or DOL approval if those dismissals and settlements are made knowingly and
voluntarily and are of a bona fide dispute. Part III.D suggests that parties
should not be able to do the same for causes of action arising under the FLSA.
Finally, Part III.E proposes an amendment to the FLSA that Congress should
adopt to implement these changes.
18.
1982).
19.
20.
21.

See Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1352, 1354 (11th Cir.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012).
29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012).
29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2012).
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I. WHY THE PERMISSION SLIP SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT BE SIGNED:
AN OVERVIEW OF THE FLSA, RULE 41,
AND OTHER FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT STATUTES
Whether settlements of FLSA causes of action and voluntary dismissals of
FLSA lawsuits should require court or DOL approval implicates both the
FLSA and Rule 41. To understand this issue, it is important to understand
the reasons these rules were created, what they sought to accomplish, and
how the understanding of them has developed over time. Part I.A provides
this information about the FLSA, while Part I.B provides this information
about Rule 41. To put this Note into context, Part I.C compares the FLSA to
other federal employment statutes. This analysis focuses on how the
similarities and differences among these statutes are reflected in their
respective treatment of private settlements of causes of action and lawsuits.
A. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
Part I.A.1 discusses the FLSA’s intended purpose. Then, Part I.A.2
outlines the FLSA’s enforcement provisions, including how claims can be
brought and the penalties imposed for violating the FLSA. Next, Part I.A.3
explains the FLSA’s lack of guidance regarding how FLSA claims can be
settled and analyzes how Congress and the courts have approached FLSA
settlements.
1. A Uniquely Protective Statute: The FLSA’s Enactment
The FLSA was first introduced on the Senate floor on May 24, 1937.22 It
was passed in response to a finding “of labor conditions detrimental to the
maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health,
efficiency, and general well-being of workers.”23 Its goal was “to correct and
as rapidly as practicable to eliminate [these conditions].”24
To accomplish this goal, Congress established a national minimum wage25
and provided for overtime compensation.26 From the time the FLSA was
introduced on the Senate floor to the day it was passed, much of President

22. S. 2475, 75th Cong. (1937).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2012).
24. Id. § 202(b). While the FLSA mentioned improving commerce as one of its goals in
addition to improving labor conditions, it was included mostly to ensure that the Act would be
allowed under the then-hotly debated Commerce Clause. See id. § 202. The Commerce Clause
gives Congress the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Drafters of New Deal
legislation saw the Commerce Clause as the best route for passing their legislation and, as a
result, often made overt references to commerceas they did with the FLSAin an attempt
to cover their legislation under the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1282 (2012) (citing
commerce as a reason to pass the Agricultural Adjustment Act, which was passed in 1933);
29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (citing commerce as a reason to pass the National Labor Relations
Act, which was passed in 1935).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 206.
26. Id. § 207.
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Franklin D. Roosevelt’s discussion of it27as well as Congress’s28focused
on providing much-needed protection for the lowest class of workers. The
Act sought to prevent employers from undercutting each other’s wages in a
“race to the bottom” that increased the number of impoverished workers and
decreased the already low standard of living among the working class.29
Without minimum wages and overtime compensation, employers would
continue to make their employees work longer hours in worse conditions for
less money.30
2. Enforcement of the FLSA
Claims regarding violations of the FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime
provisions can be enforced under the FLSA in three ways: (1) employees31
can bring private lawsuits against their employers,32 (2) the Secretary of
Labor can bring lawsuits on behalf of employees against their employers,33
or (3) the Secretary of Labor can supervise the payment of back wages owed
to employees from employers.34
Originally, the only way to enforce the FLSA was through the first option;
the second and third options were added to the Act as part of the Fair Labor
Standards Amendments of 1949.35 They were added to provide alternatives

27. See H.R. DOC. NO. 75-458, at 2–3, 8 (1938); H.R. DOC. NO. 75-255 (1937); FRANKLIN
D. ROOSEVELT, Fireside Chat, in 1938 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT 391, 391–92 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1941).
28. See H.R. REP. NO. 75-1452, at 8 (1937) (“[I]t is plain that this administration is
privileged to give relief to that large majority who constitute one-third of our population,
referred to by [President Roosevelt] as ‘ill-nourished, ill-clad, and ill-housed.’” (quoting H.R.
DOC. NO. 75-255, at 1)); S. REP. NO. 75-884, at 3–4 (1937) (“It is only those low-wage and
long-working-hour industrial workers, who are the helpless victims of their own bargaining
weakness, that this bill seeks to assist to obtain a minimum wage.”).
29. Wilkins, supra note 13, at 112–13 (quoting ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., NAT’L EMP’T
LAW PROJECT, BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS: VIOLATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AND
LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S CITIES 6 (2009), https://nelp.3cdn.net/e470538bfa5a7e7a46
_2um6br7o3.pdf [https://perma.cc/4987-6LMA]).
30. See id.
31. The FLSA applies to employees who are “engaged in commerce or in the production
of goods for commerce, or [are] employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce.” 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a), 207(a)(1). “Commerce” is defined
broadly as “trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the
several States or between any State and any place outside thereof.” Id. § 203(b). “[E]ngaged
in the production of goods” is defined as “producing, manufacturing, mining, handling,
transporting, or in any other manner working on such goods, or in any closely related process
or occupation directly essential to the production thereof, in any State.” Id. § 203(j).
“Enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce” is defined as
an enterprise with employees engaging in such activities or “handling, selling, or otherwise
working on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce” and
“whose annual gross volume of sales made or business done is not less than $500,000.” Id.
§ 203(s)(1)(A).
32. Id. § 216(b).
33. Id. § 216(c).
34. Id.
35. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-393, ch. 736, 63 Stat. 910,
919 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 216(c)).
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to private lawsuits that could benefit both employees and employers.36 The
Secretary of Labor bringing a lawsuit or supervising payment benefits
employees because employers will be more responsive to the DOL than they
will be to employees. Thus, if the DOL pursues wages owed to employees
under the FLSA, employers will be more likely to pay than if employees
bring claims themselves.37 These options also protect employers because
once the Secretary of Labor files a complaint to initiate a lawsuit or the
employee accepts wages under a DOL-supervised payment, the employee
forfeits his right to bring his own lawsuit for the same wages or to privately
receive such wages.38 This stamp of approval from the Secretary of Labor
reassures employers that they will be protected against subsequent private
lawsuits.39 No such supervision provision exists in the FLSA for settlements
of private lawsuits.40
If an employer is found liable under the FLSA, he will owe the aggrieved
employee any unpaid wages or overtime compensation and an equal amount
of liquidated damages.41 In addition, the employer must pay attorney’s fees
and costs incurred by the employee in bringing the suit.42
Section 216(b) of the FLSA gives employees the power to bring collective
actions.43 Collective actions involve employees bringing lawsuits against
their employers on behalf of themselves “and other employees similarly
situated.”44
Collective actions differ from the more well-known Rule 23 class actions,
which are discussed later in this Note.45 An important difference between
the two is that in collective actions, plaintiffs have to opt in to the lawsuit if

36. See H.R. REP. NO. 81-267, at 32 (1949) (“The underpaid employee may choose
between action by the Secretary for simply the amount which is owed to him and an individual
action brought under [29 U.S.C. § 216(b)] . . . .”).
37. See id. at 14.
38. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(c).
39. See S. REP. NO. 81-640, at 8 (1949); H.R. REP. NO. 81-267, at 31–32.
40. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
41. Id. § 216(b)–(c).
42. Id. § 216(b).
43. Id.
44. Id. Collective actions make up about 25 to 40 percent of FLSA lawsuits. See Allison
Frankel, Wells Fargo, U.S. Chamber Fail to Rewrite Wage-and-Hour Case Rules, REUTERS
(Mar. 15, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2013/03/15/wells-fargo-u-s-chamberfail-to-rewrite-wage-and-hour-case-rules/ [https://perma.cc/9HYR-RMXG] (noting that 2500
FLSA collective actions were filed in 2011); XMPT Survey Report, LITTLER 2 (Oct. 2013),
https://www.littler.com/files/press/pdf/2013-Littler-Mendelson-Xmpt-Survey-ReportOctober-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/FXY6-A3Y9] (noting that 2507 FLSA collective actions
were filed in 2012); see also Richard L. Alfred, FLSA Suits Continue to Skyrocket: New
Record High in 2015, More Than 9,000 Expected in 2016, SEYFARTH SHAW (Nov. 20, 2015),
http://www.seyfarth.com/news/FLSA-Suits-Skyrocket
[https://perma.cc/BPG7-C3Y5]
(noting that 8152 FLSA lawsuits were filed in total in 2012 and 6335 FLSA lawsuits were
filed in total in 2011); Teresa S. Valderrama, FLSA Claims and Collective Actions: How to
Avoid Claims and Defend Them, ASS’N CORP. COUNSEL 3 (Feb. 12, 2008),
http://www.acc.com/chapters/houst/upload/20080212CA.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YFX9Q2BW] (noting that of the 3000 FLSA lawsuits filed in 2004, close to 800 of them were
collective actions).
45. See infra Part I.B.
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they want to be part of it.46 In class actions, however, plaintiffs are
automatically involved in the lawsuit and have to opt out if they do not want
to be part of it.47 As a result, there are usually more plaintiffs in class actions
than in collective actions.48 This can lead to a principal-agent dynamic in
class actions, in which the lead plaintiffs represent a much larger group of
plaintiffs, most of whom are not engaged in the lawsuit.49 Plaintiffs in FLSA
collective actions, however, are part of the lawsuit because they want to be,
not because they do not care enough to leave it.50 Thus, the principal-agent
dynamic prevalent in class actions is not a concern in collective actions.
3. A Question Left Unanswered:
How to Deal with FLSA Settlements
Early U.S. Supreme Court cases held that employees could not settle for
less than what they were owed under the FLSA nor waive their right to
liquidated damages without a bona fide dispute between the parties over the
number of hours worked or compensation owed.51 In these cases, the Court
reasoned that allowing workers to settle for less than what they were owed
under the law would be a violation of the FLSA. If there was no dispute over
the amount owed to the employee or the number of hours worked by the
employee, then the employer should have to pay the employee the amount
the FLSA calls for.52 The Court also focused on the FLSA’s protection of
the lowest class of workers.53 Allowing these workers to settle for less than
what they were owed under the FLSA would be antithetical to the Act’s
purpose—to ensure a minimum wage and standard of living for all.54
46. See Daniel C. Lopez, Collective Confusion: FLSA Collective Actions, Rule 23 Class
Actions, and the Rules Enabling Act, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 275, 277–78 (2009).
47. See id.
48. See Brunsden, supra note 8, at 292–94.
49. Scott A. Moss & Nantiya Ryan, The Second-Class Class Action: How Courts Thwart
Wage Rights by Misapplying Class Action Rules, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 523, 531–32 (2012).
50. Id. at 527, 555–58; see also Brunsden, supra note 8, at 296–301. Congress
deliberately provided for collective actions to avoid class action situations in which small
groups of representatives would bring lawsuits on behalf of a larger group of unengaged
employees. See Brunsden, supra note 8, at 280 n.59 (citing 93 CONG. REC. 2182 (1947)
(statement of Sen. Forrest C. Donnell)).
51. See D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 116 (1946); Brooklyn Sav. Bank v.
O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704 (1945).
52. See Gangi, 328 U.S. at 116 (noting that a compromise of a dispute not having to do
with the compensation owed or number of hours worked “thwarts the public policy . . .
embodied in the [FLSA] by reducing the sum selected by Congress as proper compensation
for withholding wages”); O’Neil, 324 U.S. at 707 (“No one can doubt but that to allow waiver
of statutory wages by agreement would nullify the purposes of the [FLSA].”).
53. See Gangi, 328 U.S. at 116; O’Neil, 324 U.S. at 706.
54. See Gangi, 328 U.S. at 116 (stating that “the purpose of the [FLSA], which we repeat
from the O’Neil case was to secure for the lowest paid segment of the Nation’s workers a
subsistence wage, leads to the conclusion that neither wages nor the damages for withholding
them are capable of reduction by” compromise of a dispute not having to do with the
compensation owed or number of hours worked); O’Neil, 324 U.S. at 706 (“The [FLSA] was
a recognition of the fact that due to the unequal bargaining power as between employer and
employee, certain segments of the population required federal compulsory legislation to
prevent private contracts on their part which endangered national health and efficiency . . . .”).
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Further, the Court focused on the quasi-public55 rights conferred by the
FLSA.56 Individuals that bring lawsuits under the FLSA serve as private
attorneys general.57 Such lawsuits not only benefit and achieve justice for
these individuals, but ensure the fair competition and wages necessary to
maintain a minimum standard of living for all workers.58 The Court reasoned
that because a quasi-public right “may not be waived or released if such
waiver or release contravenes the statutory policy,” employees could not
waive their right to what they were owed under the FLSA.59
The Court held that employees could not waive their FLSA rights or settle
a case if there was not a bona fide dispute over the number of hours worked
or compensation owed. However, it left open the question of whether parties
could settle FLSA claims where such a dispute did exist.60 The Portal-toPortal Pay Act of 194761 (the “1947 Act”) sought to answer this question.
The 1947 Act allowed FLSA claims to be privately settled where a bona
fide dispute existed over what was owed to the employee.62 Both lawsuits
and causes of action could be settled.63 The 1947 Act pushed back against64
early Supreme Court cases65 by allowing liquidated damages to be waived
even where a bona fide dispute did not exist.66 Settlements of FLSA claims
or waivers of liquidated damages did not have to be approved.67 But the 1947
Act only allowed FLSA claims to be settled and liquidated damages to be
waived if such claims and damages were based on FLSA violations that
occurred before the 1947 Act’s passage.68
This retrospective application was the result of a practical compromise by
Congress. It realized it needed to take drastic measures to deal with a flood
of FLSA litigation that resulted from early Supreme Court cases.69 However,
55. Wilkins, supra note 13, at 112–16 (discussing and defining “quasi-public” rights).
56. O’Neil, 324 U.S. at 704 (defining a right conferred by the FLSA as “a statutory right
conferred on a private party, but affecting the public interest”).
57. Wilkins, supra note 13, at 115–16.
58. Id.
59. O’Neil, 324 U.S. at 704.
60. See D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 114–15 (1946) (concluding that it is
unnecessary “to consider here the possibility of compromises in other situations which may
arise, such as a dispute over the number of hours worked or the regular rate of employment”).
61. 29 U.S.C. §§ 251–262 (2012).
62. Id. § 253(a).
63. Id. (“Any cause of action under the [FLSA] . . . or any action . . . to enforce such a
cause of action, may hereafter be compromised in whole or in part . . . .”).
64. See id. § 251; Martinez v. Bohls Bearing Equip. Co., 361 F. Supp. 2d 608, 623 (W.D.
Tex. 2005); Regulating the Recovery of Portal-to-Portal Pay, and for Other Purposes:
Hearings on H.R. 584 and H.J. Res. 91 Before the Subcomm. No. 2 of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 80th Cong. 301 (1947) (statement of Robert B. Beach, Vice President and Executive
Secretary, National Association of Building Owners and Managers); 52 CONG. REC. 2250,
2254 (1947); 52 CONG. REC. 1543, 1555 (1947).
65. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
66. 29 U.S.C. § 253(b).
67. Id. § 253.
68. Id.
69. See id. § 251(a) (“The Congress finds that the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as
amended [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.], has been interpreted judicially in disregard of longestablished customs, practices, and contracts between employers and employees, thereby
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Congress worried that by applying the 1947 Act to future FLSA claims, the
FLSA would effectively be gutted as employers likely would be able to settle
causes of action and lawsuits for less than what the FLSA required of them.70
Thus, the 1947 Act was essentially a Band-Aid for preexisting FLSA claims.
With its retrospective application, the 1947 Act did not provide any guidance
about whether future claims or lawsuits based on FLSA violations that
occurred after its passage could be settled privately without approval.71
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41
Part I.B.1 introduces the relevant provisions of Rule 41 and the voluntary
dismissal of lawsuits. Then, Part I.B.2 discusses the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and federal statutes that are exempt from Rule 41, such that
lawsuits brought under these rules and statutes cannot be voluntarily
dismissed. Finally, Part I.B.3 explains the reasons those rules and statutes
are exempt from Rule 41.
1. Voluntary Dismissals
There is a longstanding public policy favoring private settlements of
disputes.72 This policy is embodied in Rule 41, which allows voluntary
dismissals of lawsuits.73 Lawsuits can be dismissed voluntarily either by
plaintiffs74 or court order.75 One way plaintiffs can dismiss a lawsuit without
a court order is by filing “a notice of dismissal before the opposing party
serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment.”76 The other
way is by filing “a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have
appeared.”77 The latter option is the subject of this Note.78 Unless the

creating wholly unexpected liabilities, immense in amount and retroactive in operation, upon
employers . . . .” (first alteration in original)).
70. See Marc Linder, Class Struggle at the Door: The Origins of the Portal-to-Portal Act
of 1947, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 53, 156 (1991) (stating that had the 1947 Act applied to FLSA
violations before and after the 1947 Act’s passage, the “FLSA would have been virtually
repealed” and “[v]iolations of [the] FLSA would then have been reduced to something akin to
common-law breaches of contract”).
71. See H.R. REP. NO. 80-326, at 12 (1947) (Conf. Rep.) (“It will be noted that [29 U.S.C.
§ 253] lays down no rule as to compromises or waivers with respect to causes of action
hereafter accruing.”).
72. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Settlement Agreements and the Supreme Court, 48
HASTINGS L.J. 9, 36 (1996).
73. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a).
74. Id. 41(a)(1).
75. Id. 41(a)(2).
76. Id. 41(a)(1)(A)(i).
77. Id. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). A “stipulation” is “[a] voluntary agreement between opposing
parties concerning some relevant point.” Stipulation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014). “Appearance” is defined as “[a] coming into court as a party or interested person, or
as a lawyer on behalf of a party or interested person.” Appearance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014).
78. “Stipulation of dismissal” is essentially another term for “settlement.” See generally
Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2015) (using the term
“settlement” interchangeably with “stipulated dismissal”).
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stipulation of dismissal says otherwise, the dismissal is without prejudice.79
When a case is dismissed without prejudice, “the plaintiff may refile the same
suit on the same claim” following dismissal.80 A stipulation of dismissal can
be made with prejudice if so specified.81 When a case is dismissed with
prejudice, “the plaintiff is foreclosed from filing a suit again on the same
claim or claims” following dismissal.82
Not all plaintiffs have the ability to voluntarily dismiss cases; Rule 41 is
“[s]ubject to Rules 23(e), 23.1(c), 23.2, and 66 and any applicable federal
statute.”83 These rules and statutes all contain language that explicitly
requires court approval of dismissals or settlements.84
2. Which Rules and Statutes Require
Court Approval of Dismissals?
Lawsuits brought pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23, 23.1,
23.2, and 66 cannot be dismissed without court approval. Rule 23 relates to
class actions.85 Class actions are lawsuits in which one or more members of
a class represent all members of a class in a lawsuit in which they are suing
or being sued.86 Rule 23.1 relates to derivative actions.87 Derivative actions
are lawsuits in which shareholders or members of a corporation or
unincorporated association sue a third party on behalf of the corporation or
association.88 Rule 23.2 applies to actions relating to unincorporated
associations.89 These actions are “brought by or against the members of an
unincorporated association as a class by naming certain members as
representative parties.”90 Until 1966, actions brought under Rules 23.1 and
23.2 were housed under Rule 23.91 Rule 66 relates to actions in which
79. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(B).
80. Dismissed Without Prejudice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
81. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(B).
82. Dismissed with prejudice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
83. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A).
84. See 8 U.S.C. § 1329 (2012) (“No suit or proceeding for a violation of any of the
provisions of this subchapter shall be settled, compromised, or discontinued without the
consent of the court in which it is pending and any such settlement, compromise, or
discontinuance shall be entered of record with the reasons therefor.”); 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1)
(2012) (“The action may be dismissed only if the court and the Attorney General give written
consent to the dismissal and their reasons for consenting.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (“The claims,
issues, or defenses of a certified class may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised
only with the court’s approval.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(c) (“A derivative action may be settled,
voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court’s approval.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 23.2
(“[T]he procedure for settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise must correspond with
the procedure in Rule 23(e).”); FED. R. CIV. P. 66 (“An action in which a receiver has been
appointed may be dismissed only by court order.”).
85. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
86. Id. 23(a).
87. Id. 23.1.
88. Id. 23.1(a).
89. Id. 23.2.
90. Id. An unincorporated association is an “organization that is not a legal entity separate
from the persons who compose it.” Association, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
91. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment;
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.2 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment.
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receivers are appointed, bring suit, or are sued.92 A receiver is a disinterested
person that is appointed by the court to protect or collect disputed property.93
Rule 41 mentions these specific Federal Rules of Civil Procedure before
vaguely referring to “any applicable federal statute.”94 While Rule 41’s text
does not clarify what “applicable federal statute” means, the rule drafters’
note to Rule 41 provides examples of such statutes.95 It notes that
“[p]rovisions regarding dismissal in such statutes as” 8 U.S.C. § 1329 and 31
U.S.C. § 3730 would not be affected by Rule 41.96 No other statutes are
listed as examples.97 Section 1329 is a statute within the Immigration and
Nationality Act.98 It gives district courts jurisdiction over all cases brought
by the United States arising under the immigration subchapter of the Act.99
Section 3730 allows private persons known as relators to bring civil lawsuits
on behalf of the federal government against those who have defrauded the
federal government.100 Besides these statutes and the FLSA, the only other
statute that has been considered an applicable federal statute by a court is 28
U.S.C. § 1915(g). Under this statute, a federal prisoner cannot bring a civil
action or appeal such an action if that prisoner has on three or more prior
occasions, while imprisoned, brought a lawsuit that was dismissed for being
frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.101
3. Why These Rules and Statutes Require
Court Approval of Dismissals
There are various reasons why lawsuits cannot be dismissed without
approval under these rules and statutes. Lawsuits brought under Rules 23,
23.1, and 23.2 involve small groups that are members of, and represent the
interests of, larger groups.102 Problems can arise when members of the large
group disagree with how the small group acts in the course of litigation,
especially when the small group agrees to settlements on behalf of the
whole.103 As a result, courts must approve these settlements to ensure the
larger group’s interests are well represented.104
Rule 66 requires settlements to be approved by a court because receivers
are appointed by courts and represent an extraordinary investment that a court
should employ with the “utmost caution” and grant “only in cases of clear
92. FED. R. CIV. P. 66.
93. See Receiver, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
94. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A).
95. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41 advisory committee’s note to 1937 adoption.
96. Id.
97. See id.
98. 8 U.S.C. § 1329 (2012).
99. See id.
100. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2012); see also id. § 3729.
101. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2012).
102. Susanna M. Kim, Conflicting Ideologies of Group Litigation: Who May Challenge
Settlements in Class Actions and Derivative Suits?, 66 TENN. L. REV. 81, 82–84 (1998).
103. Id. at 83–84.
104. Id. at 91–92.

240

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

necessity.”105 Allowing voluntary dismissal of these cases would give parties
power to render the time and effort invested by the court worthless.106
Further, because receivers are court appointed, voluntary dismissal of Rule
66 cases would allow parties to unilaterally remove court officers—too great
a power for parties to have.107
Settlements of lawsuits brought under § 1329 require approval because of
the duty U.S. Attorneys have to prosecute every suit brought by the United
States under the immigration subchapter of the Immigration and Nationality
Act.108 If the case is going to be settled rather than prosecuted, the court must
consent to the settlement given its jurisdiction over the case.109
Settlements of lawsuits brought under § 3730 require approval to keep
relators from reducing the government’s recovery and unjustly enriching
themselves.110 For example, in one case, a relator bargained away the United
States’ ability to bring further claims against the defendant.111 The relator
did this to increase the amount the defendant would pay in the settlement,
part of which would be paid to the relator.112 In another case, a relator, who
brought a claim on behalf of himself and a claim on behalf of himself and the
United States, negotiated with the defendant to lower the settlement amount
that would be paid to him and the United States together.113 In exchange, the
settlement amount that would be paid to him alone was increased.114 Each
relator bargained away something that was not his and which came at little
cost to himthe United States’ ability to later sue the defendant or the
amount the United States would receive from the settlement of another
claimin exchange for more money. Without an approval requirement,
relators would be able to get away with such manipulation.
In cases implicating § 1915(g), some courts have held that plaintiffs cannot
voluntarily dismiss a lawsuit merely to circumvent the “three or more prior
occasions” bar that would prevent the plaintiff from bringing or appealing
another civil lawsuit.115 The plaintiff is usually able to determine that a
lawsuit will be dismissed and seek voluntary dismissal after a magistrate
judge recommends dismissal and before a district judge actually dismisses
the case.116 Without an approval requirement, § 1915(g) would be rendered
105. 12 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2983 (3d ed. 2014).
106. Id. § 2981.
107. FED. R. CIV. P. 66 advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment (“A party should
not be permitted to oust the court and its officer without the consent of that court.”).
108. 8 U.S.C. § 1329 (2012). This type of requirement does not appear anywhere else in
the U.S. Code.
109. Id.
110. Searcy v. Philips Elec. N. Am. Corp., 117 F.3d 154, 160 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing United
States ex rel. Killingsworth v. Northrop Corp., 25 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 1994)).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Killingsworth, 25 F.3d at 718.
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., Large v. Beckham Cty. Dist. Court, 558 F. App’x 827, 828 (10th Cir. 2014);
Ludy v. Nelson, No. 5:13-CV-353, 2014 WL 468509, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 2014); see also
supra note 101 and accompanying text.
116. See Large, 558 F. App’x at 828; Ludy, 2014 WL 468509, at *1.
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moot because a plaintiff could easily find ways around it through voluntary
dismissal.
C. The Odd Man Out: Comparing the FLSA’s Treatment of Settlements
to That of Other Federal Employment Statutes
Part I.C.1 compares the FLSA to other federal employment statutes in
terms of their purposes and whom they seek to protect. Next, Part I.C.2
discusses how the FLSA and the other statutes treat settlements of claims.
1. Other Federal Employment Statutes
The FLSA is a federal employment statute. Thus, it is important to
compare it to other federal employment statutes to get a better understanding
of its unique aspects. Federal employment statutes that are useful
comparators in the approval-of-settlements context include Title VII, the
ADEA, and the FMLA.117 Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.118 The ADEA
prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of age.119 The FMLA
requires employers to provide their employees with the ability to take unpaid,
job-protected leave for family and medical reasons.120 Like the FLSA, each
of these acts allows lawsuits to be brought either by aggrieved employees or
a government body on behalf of those employees.121
Title VII122 and the FMLA123 are generally applicable statutes; they do not
necessarily seek to protect one specific group of people. The ADEA and the
FLSA, however, seek to help specific groups of workers. The FLSA seeks
to protect the most vulnerable, lowest paid segments of the workforce.124
The ADEA seeks to protect older workers.125

117. See Socias v. Vornado Realty L.P., 297 F.R.D. 38, 40–41 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (comparing
the FLSA to the ADEA and the FMLA to determine whether Rule 41 voluntary dismissals of
FLSA lawsuits require approval); Martinez v. Bohls Bearing Equip. Co., 361 F. Supp. 2d 608,
630 (W.D. Tex. 2005) (comparing the FLSA to the ADEA and Title VII to determine whether
FLSA settlements that had not been approved by the court or the DOL should be enforceable);
Andrew C. Kuettel, A Call to Congress to Add a “Knowing and Voluntary” Waiver Provision
to the Fair Labor Standards Act to Enable Private Resolution of Wage Disputes, 30 A.B.A. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 409, 419–24 (2015) (comparing the FLSA to Title VII, the ADEA, and the
FMLA to determine whether FLSA settlements that had not been approved by the court or the
DOL should be enforceable).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
119. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2012).
120. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2012).
121. 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(c), 2617(a)–(b); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f).
122. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(a), (f), 2000e-2 to -3.
123. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601(b)(2), 2611(3).
124. See H.R. DOC. NO. 75-255, at 1–2 (1937).
125. See 29 U.S.C. § 621(b).
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2. Treatment of Voluntary Dismissals and Settlements
by Other Federal Employment Statutes
The best way to determine whether a statute requires settlements to be
approved is to look to its text. The FLSA does not explicitly state that private
settlements should be allowed without court approval. But most courts have
held that FLSA settlements must be approved to be enforceable.126 The
FMLA and ADEA have been amended to explicitly allow private settlements
without court approval. The FMLA and regulations allow FMLA claims to
be privately settled and waived based on retrospective, but not prospective,
violations.127 The ADEA, as amended by the Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act,128 is much stricter than the FMLA in terms of when it allows
private settlements. It allows workers to settle ADEA causes of action and
lawsuits only if their settlement is “knowing and voluntary[,]” a standard
based on a very detailed and strict set of statutory requirements.129 Title VII
has no explicit provision regarding settlement. However, Title VII case law
generally supports the proposition that private settlements of Title VII claims
are allowed without approval only if the settlement is “knowing and
voluntary,” although “knowing and voluntary” is not defined as explicitly in
Title VII case law as it is in the text of the ADEA.130
The ADEA standard is most similar to the majority view that FLSA
settlements must be approved. This is because the ADEA’s enforcement
mechanisms are modeled after the FLSA’s enforcement mechanisms.131
Congress recognized that, like the population the FLSA protects, the elderly
population the ADEA protects is vulnerable;132 the elderly can be
manipulated or coerced into settlements and often sign settlements without
126. See infra Part II.A.
127. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) (2013).
128. Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990).
129. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f). The waiver of one’s rights in the settlement of a lawsuit is
“knowing and voluntary” if (1) “the waiver is part of an agreement between the individual and
the employer that is written in a manner calculated to be understood by such individual, or by
the average individual eligible to participate,” (2) the waiver clearly refers to ADEA rights,
(3) the individual does not waive his prospective rights, (4) “the individual waives rights or
claims only in exchange for consideration in addition to anything of value to which the
individual already is entitled,” (5) “the individual is advised in writing to consult with an
attorney prior to executing the agreement,” and (6) the individual has a reasonable amount of
time to consider the settlement. See id. § 626(f)(2). The ADEA also allows employees to settle
causes of action if such settlements meet similar requirements. See id. § 626(f)(1).
130. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 n.15 (1974); see also Daniel
P. O’Gorman, A State of Disarray: The “Knowing and Voluntary” Standard for Releasing
Claims Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 74 (2005)
(“[T]he courts of appeal agree that a person can waive a Title VII claim if the person’s consent
to the release is ‘knowing’ and ‘voluntary’ . . . .”).
131. See S. REP. NO. 101-79, pt. 2, at 3, 12–13 (1989).
132. Id. at 9 (“It is not accidental that Congress incorporated into the ADEA many of the
protective procedures of the FLSA. Age discrimination victims typically earn more than the
minimum wage, [but not by much]. Moreover, once out of work, these older Americans have
less than a 50/50 chance of ever finding new employment. The [sic] often have little or no
savings and may not yet be eligible for Social Security . . . . Accordingly, it is reasonable to
assume that many employees would be coerced by circumstances into accepting significant
compromises.”).
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knowing or understanding their rights or claims.133 In amending the ADEA
to implement the knowing and voluntary standard, Congress purposefully did
not make this standard as strict as the FLSA standard. Instead, Congress
decided to allow private, unapproved settlements of ADEA claims in certain
circumstances, despite its understanding that such settlements are disallowed
by most courts under the FLSA.134
The main reason for this distinction is the difference in the types of facts
involved in cases brought under these acts. Suits under the ADEA generally
involve complex, nuanced issues of fact, such as whether there was motive
and intent to discriminate.135 By contrast, FLSA suits involve hard facts,
such as the number of hours worked or compensation due.136 Accordingly,
determining how much an FLSA plaintiff is owed is easier than determining
how much an ADEA plaintiff is owed, and determining an FLSA settlement’s
fairness is easier than determining an ADEA settlement’s fairness.137
Another reason for the difference in standards is that the FLSA protects a
population that is more vulnerable as a whole than the ADEA; the entire
FLSA population consists of poorly paid working-class individuals, whereas
at least part of the ADEA’s population is made up of highly paid workers
who have the resources to protect themselves.138
II. WHICH COURTS REQUIRE THE PERMISSION SLIP TO BE SIGNED?:
THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER WHETHER APPROVAL IS REQUIRED
Parts II.A and II.B discuss the circuit split over whether private settlements
of FLSA claims need to be approved by a district court or the DOL to be
enforceable. Then, Parts II.C and II.D analyze a Second Circuit decision and
an Eastern District of New York decision that the Second Circuit decision
abrogated over whether Rule 41 voluntary dismissals of FLSA lawsuits need
to be approved by a district court or the DOL to be enforceable.

133. Id. at 9–12.
134. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-221, pt. 3, at 14 (1989) (“Unlike the enforcement provisions of
the [FLSA], which provide that employees may not waive their rights without supervision, the
instant bill provides for the first time that a valid waiver may occur in limited circumstances.”).
135. See Waivers Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Hearing on Aging
Comm. Pub. No. 101-722 and Education & Labor Comm. Pub. No. 101-31, 101st Cong. 73
(1989) [hereinafter ADEA Hearings] (statement of David A. Cathcart, Attorney at Law,
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP); S. REP. NO. 101-79, pt. 10, at 32; see also Runyan v. Nat’l
Cash Register Corp., 787 F.2d 1039, 1044 n.8 (6th Cir. 1986).
136. ADEA Hearings, supra note 135, at 73; S. REP. NO. 101-79, pt. 10, at 32; see also
Runyan, 787 F.2d at 1044 n.8.
137. ADEA Hearings, supra note 135, at 73; S. REP. NO. 101-79, pt. 10, at 32; see also
Runyan, 787 F.2d at 1044 n.8.
138. ADEA Hearings, supra note 135, at 72 (noting a landmark ADEA case in which the
plaintiff was “a well-paid, well-educated, labor lawyer with many years of experience in this
area” (quoting Runyan, 787 F.2d at 1044)); see also Runyan, 787 F.2d at 1043 (noting that the
FLSA was meant to protect “the lowest paid segment” of workers, while the ADEA protected
“an entirely different segment of employees, many of whom were highly paid and capable of
securing legal assistance without difficulty” (first quoting D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328
U.S. 108, 116 (1946))).
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A. The Eleventh Circuit Leads and (Almost) Everyone Follows:
The Majority View That FLSA Settlements Require Approval
In Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States,139 the Eleventh Circuit held
that settlements of FLSA claims require court or DOL approval to be
enforceable.140 Most federal courts have followed suit and adopted Lynn’s
Food, making its holding the majority view.141
The Eleventh Circuit held that FLSA settlements must occur in one of two
ways to be enforceable: (1) payment supervised by the Secretary of Labor
under § 216(c) of the FLSA or (2) a district court’s stipulated judgment in
lawsuits brought directly by employees under § 216(b) of the FLSA in which
the parties have presented the court with a proposed settlement and the court
has reviewed the settlement for fairness and determined it is fair and of a
bona fide dispute.142 Under the second option, settlements of causes of action
cannot be approved and settlements of lawsuits are not automatically
approved but are simply approvable.143 Given that the settlement at issue did
not fit either of these options, the court was not allowed to approve it, and the
settlement was not enforceable.144
While § 216(b) allows private lawsuits, it says nothing about stipulated
judgments or reviewing settlements for fairness. As a result, the court had to
rely on case law as opposed to the text of the statute to provide support for
the second option.145 Next, the court dealt with the 1947 Act’s provision
allowing FLSA causes of action and lawsuits to be privately settled outside
of litigation and without court or DOL approval.146 The court held that this
provision applied only to lawsuits which “accrued prior to” the 1947 Act’s
passage and was not applicable to the case.147
In providing the reasoning for its holding, the court described the FLSA’s
goal of protecting workers from low wages and long hours and the extra
protection that workers need due to the unequal bargaining power between
them and their employers.148 The court then focused on some of the glaring
139. 679 F.2d 1350 (11th Cir. 1982); see also supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text.
140. Id. at 1352–53.
141. See Kuettel, supra note 117, at 410 (calling this view the “traditional and majority
approach”). Almost all of the circuit courts that have dealt with the issue of settlement
approval have come out this way. See, e.g., Seminiano v. Xyris Enter., Inc., 602 F. App’x 682,
683 (9th Cir. 2015); Copeland v. ABB, Inc., 521 F.3d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 2008); Taylor v.
Progress Energy, Inc., 493 F.3d 454, 460 (4th Cir. 2007), superseded on other grounds,
Whiting v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 416 F. App’x 312 (4th Cir. 2011). But see Martin v. Spring
Break ’83 Prods., 688 F.3d 247 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that FLSA settlements do not need to
be approved by a court or the DOL to be enforceable). The Seventh Circuit acknowledged,
but did not explicitly adopt, Lynn’s Food. See Walton v. United Consumers Club, Inc., 786
F.2d 303, 306 (7th Cir. 1986) (“Courts . . . have refused to enforce wholly private settlements
[of FLSA claims].”).
142. Lynn’s Food, 679 F.2d at 1352–53, 1355.
143. Id. at 1354.
144. Id. at 1355.
145. See id. at 1353 (citing D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 113 & n.8 (1946);
Jarrard v. Se. Shipbuilding Corp., 163 F.2d 960, 961 (5th Cir. 1947)).
146. Id. at 1353 n.7.
147. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 253 (2012)).
148. Id. at 1352.
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facts of the case.149 It also noted that a major problem with the settlement
agreement was that it was not made in “the adversarial context of a
lawsuit.”150 A lawsuit provides benefits to employees such as the increased
likelihood of attorney representation.151 Given these benefits, had the
settlement agreement been made in the context of a lawsuit, it may have been
approvable.152 But the court held that, even though a settlement made in the
adversarial context of a lawsuit is “more likely to reflect a reasonable
compromise” than one made outside of it, court approval is still required for
both.153 The absence of such a requirement would “be in clear derogation of
the letter and spirit of the FLSA.”154
B. The Fifth Circuit Tries to Lead and No One Follows:
The Minority View That FLSA Settlements
Do Not Require Approval
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Martin v. Spring Break ’83 Productions,
LLC155 stands in direct contrast to the Eleventh Circuit’s Lynn’s Food
decision. It represents the minority view that private settlements of FLSA
claims do not need to be approved by a court or the DOL to be enforceable.
The case involved unionized technicians who had filed a grievance against
their employer alleging that they had not been paid properly under the
FLSA.156 The employees sent their union representative to investigate the
issue but, when he concluded that it would be impossible to determine the
number of hours the employees had actually worked, he agreed to settle the
FLSA claims with the employer on behalf of the employees.157 The
settlement was signed after the workers filed a lawsuit based on the FLSA
claims.158
The Fifth Circuit held that parties could privately settle FLSA claims
without court or DOL approval “where there is a bona fide dispute as to the
amount of hours worked or compensation due.”159 By settling a bona fide
dispute, the workers were not waiving their statutory right to compensation;
given that the parties disagreed about how much was owed to the employees
it was impossible to determine whether the payment was more or less than
the amount owed under the FLSA.160 Even though the workers may have
been unhappy with the amount they received from the settlement, their
149. Id. at 1354 (holding that the employer’s actions in negotiating a settlement with its
employees constituted a “virtual catalog of the sort of practices which the FLSA was intended
to prohibit”).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. 688 F.3d 247 (5th Cir. 2012).
156. Id. at 249.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 249–50.
159. Id. at 255 (quoting Martinez v. Bohls Bearing Equip. Co., 361 F. Supp. 2d 608, 631
(W.D. Tex. 2005)).
160. Id. at 255–57.
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representative agreed to that amount to settle the dispute over the number of
hours worked and, therefore, the court did not have a legitimate reason to
invalidate the settlement.161 Thus, the court held that the settlement, though
not approved by a court or the DOL, was enforceable.162
The Martin court sought to distinguish its case from Lynn’s Food by
comparing the facts of the two cases. Martin involved knowledgeable
workers who were represented in negotiations and had legal counsel before
settling the cases.163 Lynn’s Food, however, involved uninformed workers
who neither had legal counsel nor seemed to know their rights.164 Further,
the Martin court held that, because the settlement agreement had been entered
into after the workers had initiated a lawsuit against their employer, the
Lynn’s Food court’s concerns were not implicated.165 The problem with this
reasoning was that the Martin court endorsed166 a district court case arising
within the Fifth Circuit, Martinez v. Bohls Bearing Equipment Co.,167 that
involved an unrepresented worker agreeing to a settlement before a lawsuit
had been initiated.168
Martinez involved a worker who sued his employer for unpaid overtime
compensation.169 Before the lawsuit, the plaintiff agreed to a settlement with
his employer in which he accepted $1000 as a “full settlement for all overtime
in question.”170 The court held that this settlement was enforceable even
though it had not been approved by a court or the DOL.171 The court
essentially applied a two-part test to determine whether the settlement was
enforceable. First, the settlement had to be of a bona fide dispute over the
number of hours worked or compensation owed.172 Since the parties
disagreed about whether the plaintiff had been paid overtime and what
amount of overtime was owed to the plaintiff, a bona fide dispute existed.173
Second, after a bona fide dispute was shown, the court determined whether
the settlement agreement constituted a valid release of the plaintiff’s FLSA
rights.174 The court held that for a settlement of a bona fide dispute to act as
a valid release of rights, “[t]here must be a final meeting of the minds upon
the compromise, with a full understanding of the dispute and the effect of the

161. See id. at 255–56 (holding that there was little danger of employees being
disadvantaged where the settlement gave them “everything to which they [were] entitled under
the FLSA at the time the agreement [was] reached” (quoting Thomas v. Louisiana, 534 F.2d
613, 615 (5th Cir. 1976))).
162. Id. at 257.
163. See id. at 256 n.10.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 255, 257 (affirming the district court’s decision which adopted the holding
and logic of Martinez and relying on the holding and logic of Martinez itself).
167. 361 F. Supp. 2d 608 (W.D. Tex. 2005).
168. Id. at 612–13.
169. Id. at 613.
170. Id. at 612.
171. Id. at 632.
172. Id. at 631.
173. Id. at 631–32.
174. Id. at 632.
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compromise.”175 The settlement agreement constituted a valid release of the
plaintiff’s FLSA rights because “‘[t]he remedy sought and settled [was] the
precise remedy sought’ in the litigation”;176 the parties had agreed to settle
the overtime compensation owed to the plaintiff and the plaintiff sued for that
same overtime compensation.
The Martinez court criticized the decisions requiring settlements to be
approved for being too reliant on policy concerns such as poor labor
conditions and unequal bargaining power.177 These concerns tempted courts
to “promulgate social values which, at best, intrude upon the legislative
sphere, and at worst reflect imprecise apprehensions of economics and
desirable public policy.”178
C. Another Question Left Open?:
Is the FLSA an Applicable Federal Statute Under Rule 41?
While Lynn’s Food and Martin differ over whether private FLSA
settlement agreements not approved by a court or the DOL are enforceable,
some courts, including the Second Circuit, believe they did not answer
whether courts or the DOL are required to evaluate and approve proposed
settlement agreements for those settlements to later be enforceable.179
In Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc.,180 an employee sued his
former employer for unpaid overtime compensation.181 After an initial
conference and some discovery, the parties privately settled the case and filed
a joint stipulation of dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41.182 The court
refused to accept the stipulation because the settlement had not been
approved by the court or the DOL.183 Such approval was required because
175. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Strand v. Garden Valley Tel. Co., 51 F. Supp. 898,
905 (D. Minn. 1943)).
176. Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Strozier v. Gen. Motors Corp., 635 F.2d 424,
426 (5th Cir. 1981)).
177. See id. at 627–29. The court noted that Lynn’s Foodthe only decision that squarely
dealt with the issue of whether FLSA settlements required approvalwas largely based on
the egregious facts of the case. Id. at 628 (citing Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States,
679 F.2d 1350, 1354–55 (11th Cir. 1982)).
178. Id. at 627 (quoting United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 861
(5th Cir. 1975)).
179. See, e.g., Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199, 204 (2d Cir. 2015)
(“[Lynn’s Food and Martin] arise in the context of whether a private FLSA settlement is
enforceable. The question before us, however, asks whether the parties can enter into a private
stipulated dismissal of FLSA claims with prejudice, without the involvement of the district
court or DOL, that may later be enforceable.”); Nyazee v. MBR Mgmt. Corp., No. 4:14-CV01561, 2016 WL 126363, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 12, 2016) (“[Lynn’s Food does not] inform the
Court whether it must evaluate and approve a private FLSA settlement, or whether such
approval is a prerequisite for subsequent judicial enforcement of a private settlement.”);
Carrillo v. Dandan Inc., 51 F. Supp. 3d 124, 131 (D.D.C. 2014) (“Whether an FLSA settlement
is legally enforceable, which [Lynn’s Food] addressed, is distinct from whether a court
mustor shouldevaluate such a proposed settlement ex ante.”).
180. 796 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2015).
181. Id. at 200.
182. Id.
183. Id. The parties then appealed the case to the Second Circuit, which affirmed the
district court’s holding that the settlement had to be approved and remanded the case. Id. at
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the FLSA qualified as an “applicable federal statute” under Rule 41.184 Thus,
the case could not be dismissed without a court order or DOL approval.185
The Second Circuit held that the FLSA qualified as an applicable federal
statute under Rule 41 because of the policy underlying the FLSA.186 The
court focused on the Supreme Court’s liberal interpretation of the FLSA as a
statute with particularly broad protections187 and a goal “to extend the
frontiers of social progress” by ensuring a living wage to all workers.188 The
court’s concern was that private settlements would allow employers to
continue to take advantage of their workers.189 Without an approval
requirement, workers would not get the pay they deserved under the statute
and less scrupulous employers would not be incentivized to change their
underhanded dealings.190 This would cause workers as a whole to suffer.191
D. The Martin of Rule 41: Picerni
The Cheeks decision abrogated an earlier decision, Picerni v. Bilingual Seit
& Preschool, Inc.,192 made two years earlier by the Eastern District of New
York. In that case, a teacher brought a collective action against her employer
Not long after the lawsuit’s
for minimum wage violations.193
commencement, the parties settled and the plaintiff filed a notice of
acceptance of an offer of judgment.194 After the court declined to enter
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68,195 the parties were
directed by a court order to file a motion to approve the settlement.196 Four
months later, the court vacated its own order and allowed the parties to settle
without court approval.197 The court held that the FLSA was not an
applicable federal statute under Rule 41, and thus the parties could
voluntarily dismiss the case without approval.198

201. The lawsuit was dismissed without prejudice with the parties stipulating that they did
not believe their settlement agreement to be binding and enforceable without court approval.
See Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., No. 12-CV-04199 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2017);
Response to September 21, 2016 Order, Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., No. 12-CV04199 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2016).
184. Cheeks, 796 F.3d at 206.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. (quoting A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945)).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See id.
192. 925 F. Supp. 2d 368 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), abrogated by Cheeks, 796 F.3d 199.
193. Id. at 369.
194. Id.
195. FED. R. CIV. P. 68. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 allows a defendant to serve on
the plaintiff “an offer to allow judgment on specified terms” that the plaintiff can accept,
essentially acting as a settlement. Id.
196. Picerni, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 369 (holding that because it was an FLSA case, it had to
be approved by a court or the DOL and could not be resolved under a Rule 68 offer of
judgment).
197. Id. at 379.
198. Id. at 373.
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In coming to the conclusion that the FLSA was not an applicable federal
statute, the court focused on the absence of an explicit approval requirement
in the FLSA, a feature of all applicable federal statutes and rules under Rule
41.199 The court also highlighted a practical problem: many FLSA cases are
so small that if courts were to deny settlements, then parties would lack
incentive to proceed further with litigation.200 In these types of cases,
rejecting a settlement not only fails to accomplish anything, but it harms the
parties.201 The parties have to pay additional litigation expenses they cannot
afford and, even if the employee wins, the employer likely will not pay.202
Further, the court is keeping a plaintiff from a settlement that is small yet
acceptable and helpful to him, all in the name of “some Platonic form of the
ideal of judicial vindication.”203 Given these practical consequences, the
court reasoned that rejecting a settlement that everyone was happy with did
nothing to accomplish the FLSA’s purposes.204
The issues brought before the Cheeks and Picerni courts were whether the
FLSA constituted an applicable federal statute under Rule 41 and therefore
whether FLSA cases could be voluntarily dismissed without court or DOL
approval.205 But the courts framed these questions differently. The Cheeks
court addressed whether parties could voluntarily dismiss an FLSA lawsuit
under Rule 41 without court or DOL approval and later enforce that
settlement.206 The Picerni court addressed only the first half of that
question;207 it did not decide whether a voluntary dismissal would later be
enforceable. In fact, the court recognized that parties dismissing FLSA cases
under Rule 41 would be “[taking] their chances that their settlement [would]
not be effective.”208 Thus, unlike the Cheeks court, the Picerni court
assumed either that unapproved settlements would be made without prejudice
or that it did not necessarily matter for enforceability purposes whether they
were made with or without prejudice.209 The main goal of its holding was to
ensure that parties would be given the power under Rule 41 to dismiss FLSA
lawsuits when and how they wanted to.210 The Cheeks holding, by contrast,
dealt explicitly with dismissals made with prejudice and did not address the

199. Id. at 375; see also supra note 84 and accompanying text.
200. See Picerni, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 377.
201. See id. at 378.
202. See id.
203. Id. at 377. The court also noted that by rejecting the settlement, the court would be
keeping a plaintiff’s attorney, likely satisfied with his fee, and a defendant, who could barely
afford to pay the settlement, let alone hire an attorney, from closure. Id.
204. See id.
205. See Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199, 201 (2d Cir. 2015);
Picerni, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 368–69.
206. Cheeks, 796 F.3d at 204.
207. Picerni, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 374.
208. Id. at 373.
209. Id. (“[I]t is one thing to say that . . . a private settlement will not, under certain
circumstances, be enforced in subsequent litigation [but] it is quite another to say that even if
the parties want to take their chances that their settlement will not be effective, the Court will
not permit them to do so.”).
210. Id. at 372–73.
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issue of how courts should handle dismissals of FLSA lawsuits without
prejudice.211
III. SHOULD THE PERMISSION SLIP HAVE TO BE SIGNED?:
A SOLUTION TO THE APPROVAL REQUIREMENT
Part III.A argues that, despite some differences, the Fifth-Eleventh Circuit
split is very similar to the discrepancy between the Second Circuit and the
Eastern District of New York. Part III.B discusses why the FLSA should not
be considered an applicable federal statute under Rule 41 and why Cheeks
should be overturned. Next, Part III.C discusses the implications of that
conclusion, namely that settlements and voluntary dismissals of FLSA
lawsuits should be allowed without court approval. As a result of this
decision, Lynn’s Food must be overturned. Part III.D then argues that even
though FLSA settlements of lawsuits should be allowed without court
approval as Rule 41 voluntary dismissals, private settlements of FLSA causes
of action should require court or DOL approval to be enforceable. Martin
and Martinez should, therefore, be overturned. Finally, Part III.E suggests
the congressional action required to implement the decisions made in Parts
III.B to III.D.
A. Reconciling the Lynn’s Food-Martin Circuit Split
and the Cheeks-Picerni Conflict
There are some differences between the Cheeks and Picerni decisions and
the Lynn’s Food and Martin decisions. The holdings in Lynn’s Food and
Martin were based on an interpretation of the FLSA.212 The holdings in
Cheeks and Picerni were based on both an interpretation of the FLSA and of
Rule 41.213 Lynn’s Food involved a settlement that had been agreed to before
a lawsuit.214 While Martin involved a settlement agreed to after a lawsuit
had begun, its reasoning was based on a case involving a settlement that had
been agreed to before a lawsuit.215 In Cheeks and Picerni, the settlement was
agreed to after the lawsuit had begun.216 In Lynn’s Food, the employer was
trying to enforce the settlement agreement.217 In Martin, the employees were

211. See Cheeks, 796 F.3d at 201 n.2 (“As it is not before us, we leave for another day the
question of whether parties may settle such cases without court approval or DOL supervision
by entering into a Rule 41(a)(1)(A) stipulation without prejudice.”).
212. See Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 1982)
(noting that the route for settling private FLSA settlements is “provided in the context of suits
brought . . . under section 216(b) [of the FLSA]”); Martin v. Spring Break ’83 Prods., LLC,
797 F. Supp. 2d 719, 730 (E.D. La. 2011), aff’d, 688 F.3d 247 (5th Cir. 2012) (adopting the
holding of a case with reasoning based on a “thorough historical analysis of the FLSA, its
amendments, and case law” (citing Martinez v. Bohls Bearing Equip. Co., 361 F. Supp. 2d
608, 631 (W.D. Tex. 2005))).
213. Cheeks, 796 F.3d at 201; Picerni, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 375.
214. Lynn’s Food, 679 F.2d at 1352.
215. Martin, 688 F.3d at 255.
216. Cheeks, 796 F.3d at 200; Picerni, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 369.
217. Lynn’s Food, 679 F.2d at 1351–52.
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trying to prevent the enforcement of the settlement agreement.218 In Cheeks
and Picerni, both parties wanted the settlement agreement to be approved.219
Despite these differences, the Cheeks and Lynn’s Food holdings are
similar. The main holding in Lynn’s Food was that unapproved FLSA
settlements are not enforceable.220 Its reasoning for this holding was that
private lawsuits can only be settled by the parties proposing a settlement of a
lawsuit to the court and having that settlement approved by a stipulated
judgment after the court scrutinizes it for fairness.221 Thus, despite what
Cheeks and its progeny assert,222 the court in Lynn’s Food did not leave open
the question of whether courts or the DOL are required to evaluate and
approve proposed settlement agreements for those settlements to later be
enforceable; it answered this question in the affirmative. For this reason, the
settlement in Lynn’s Food was not enforceable.
This interpretation of Lynn’s Food is supported by a decision arising in the
same circuit. In Dees v. Hydradry, Inc.,223 the court held that parties could
not voluntarily dismiss FLSA lawsuits under Rule 41 because the Lynn’s
Food court held that a district court must approve the dismissal of an FLSA
lawsuit for that dismissal to be later enforceable.224 Thus, like Cheeks, Dees
held that the FLSA was an applicable federal statute and that dismissals of
FLSA lawsuits required court approval.225 Unlike Cheeks, Dees squarely
relied on the reasoning in Lynn’s Food to support that proposition.226
Thus, while the fact patterns and language used in Lynn’s Food and Cheeks
are different, their holdings are essentially the same: both require FLSA
settlements of lawsuits to be either stipulated judgments by the court or
approved by the DOL to be enforceable.227 Both holdings also require courts
or the DOL to review settlements for fairness before approving them.228 One
interesting difference between the two decisions is their treatment of bona
fide dispute requirements. The Lynn’s Food decision requires settlements to
be of a bona fide dispute to be approved.229 The Cheeks court not only
218. Martin, 688 F.3d at 254.
219. Cheeks, 796 F.3d at 200–01; Picerni, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 369.
220. Lynn’s Food, 679 F.2d at 1355.
221. Id. at 1353.
222. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
223. 706 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (M.D. Fla. 2010).
224. Id. at 1237–38, 1244.
225. See id. at 1244; see also Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199, 206
(2d Cir. 2015).
226. See Dees, 706 F. Supp. 2d at 1244.
227. See Cheeks, 796 F.3d at 206 (holding that “stipulated dismissals settling FLSA claims
with prejudice require the approval of the district court or the DOL to take effect” (emphasis
added)); Lynn’s Food, 679 F.2d at 1353 (holding that “a proposed settlement” of FLSA claims
requires approval by a district court’s “stipulated judgment” or the DOL to take effect
(emphasis added)). Approval of a stipulated dismissal is the definition of a stipulated
judgment. See Agreed Judgment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “agreed
judgment” as “[a] settlement that becomes a court judgment when the judge sanctions it” and
noting that it is also termed “consent judgment; stipulated judgment; judgment by consent”
(emphasis added)); see also supra note 78 and accompanying text.
228. Cheeks, 796 F.3d at 200–01; Lynn’s Food, 679 F.2d at 1355.
229. Lynn’s Food, 679 F.2d at 1355.
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refused to decide whether a bona fide dispute existed in its case, but it also
refused to rule on whether the settlement had to be of a bona fide dispute to
be approved,230 even though almost all courts recognize this bona fide
dispute requirement.231
B. The FLSA Is Not an Applicable
Federal Statute Under Rule 41
Part III.B.1 discusses how the FLSA differs from applicable federal
statutes and rules under Rule 41 both textually and characteristically. It
concludes that these differences should prevent the FLSA from being exempt
from Rule 41. Next, Part III.B.2 briefly notes the concept of dismissing cases
with prejudice. Because the FLSA is not an applicable federal statute under
Rule 41, FLSA lawsuits should be able to be dismissed with or without
prejudice. Based on these determinations, Cheeks must be overturned given
its holding that the FLSA is an applicable federal statute under Rule 41 and
that FLSA lawsuits cannot be voluntarily dismissed with prejudice.232
1. The FLSA Does Not Fit
the Applicable Federal Statute Mold
The FLSA is not an applicable federal statute under Rule 41. While the
FLSA may be a protective statute, it would be an outcast among the other
rules and statutes that are exempt from Rule 41. The most important
difference between the FLSA and those rules and statutes is that the FLSA
contains no provision explicitly requiring the approval of private
settlements.233 Further, Rule 41’s advisory committee specifically pointed
to 8 U.S.C. § 1329 and 31 U.S.C. § 3730 as statutes that would qualify as
applicable federal statutes in its note to the Rule when the Rule was adopted
in 1937.234 The note states, “Provisions regarding dismissal in such statutes
as [these] are preserved by [Rule 41(a)(1)].”235 The “in such statutes as”236
language suggests that this was not meant to be an exclusive list. The
“[p]rovisions regarding dismissal”237 language would disqualify the FLSA
as an applicable federal statute, however, as it has no such provision to
preserve. This language would also disqualify 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) from
being an applicable federal statute since it has no such provision to preserve.
Until Congress adopts such a provision for each statute, one should not be
read into either 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) or the FLSA.
230. Cheeks, 796 F.3d at 203 n.3 (“[W]e express no opinion as to whether a bona fide
dispute exists here, or what the district court must consider in deciding whether to approve the
putative settlement of Cheeks’ claims.”).
231. See Picerni v. Bilingual Seit & Preschool Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 368, 371 (E.D.N.Y.
2013) (“All courts seem to agree that if an FLSA release is going to be upheld, it must be
where there is a bona fide dispute . . . .”), abrogated by Cheeks, 796 F.3d 199.
232. See supra notes 183–86 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
234. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41 advisory committee’s note to 1937 adoption.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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Congress, however, should not adopt such a provision for the FLSA. Not
only does the FLSA lack the explicit requirements of an applicable federal
statute or rule but it lacks the characteristics of one that would make approval
necessary.
Most FLSA lawsuitsunlike class actions, derivative actions, and actions
relating to unincorporated associationsdo not involve small groups of
plaintiffs representing large groups of uninterested plaintiffs who were added
to the lawsuit by operation of law.238 To be a plaintiff in an FLSA case, an
individual must initiate the action or opt in to a collective action.239 This
results in smaller classes of more-engaged plaintiffs.240 Accordingly, the
interests of all plaintiffs are better protected in collective actions than in class
actions.
Unlike lawsuits under Rule 66, in which the court appoints a receiver,
FLSA lawsuits typically do not involve an extraordinary investment of time
or effort on the court’s part.241 In FLSA cases, the court does not have to
appoint a special officer, and the parties often work out a settlement on their
own.242
The FLSA also differs from applicable federal statutes in important ways.
Section 1329 requires U.S. Attorneys to prosecute every suit that the United
States brings under the relevant statutes.243 The FLSA has no such
requirement. In suits brought under § 3730(b), relators can manipulate
settlements by bringing and settling suits on behalf of the United States that
the United States does not get involved in to achieve settlements that are
beneficial to themselves but not to the United States.244 There is no such
concern with claims brought under the FLSA; plaintiffs still have to either
bring the suit or affirmatively opt in to it and are therefore much more likely
to be engaged in the suit.245
It is possible that settlements in FLSA cases could be manipulated if
settlements of private lawsuits did not have to be approved but settlements of
causes of action did, as this Note suggests should be the case.246 If this were
the case, unscrupulous employers would be incentivized to construct
litigation that skirts the approval requirement for settling causes of action.
Further, plaintiffs’ attorneys could also be incentivized to work with
employers to construct this litigation and maximize the attorneys’ fees they
would receive in a settlement, which would likely decrease the amount the
plaintiff would receive.
238. See supra notes 45–50, 102–04 and accompanying text.
239. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012); see also supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 45–50, 102–04 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 105–07 and accompanying text.
242. Picerni v. Bilingual Seit & Preschool Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 368, 372 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)
(noting that in the typical FLSA case the employer does not even make an appearance and
plaintiff’s counsel informs the judge that the case is over before any proceedings take place),
abrogated by Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2015).
243. See 8 U.S.C. § 1329 (2012).
244. See supra notes 110–14 and accompanying text.
245. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012); see also supra note 50 and accompanying text.
246. See infra Part III.C–E.
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Given these perverse incentives, it may be argued that if settlements of
causes of action have to be approved, settlements of lawsuits should have to
be approved as well. Plaintiffs’ attorneys bargaining away their client’s
award in exchange for more money for themselves parallels the problem of
relators bargaining away something belonging to the United States, but there
are important differences between the two.247 In lawsuits brought under
§ 3730(b), relators are the ones who sue; the United States has the right not
to intervene or get involved.248 This is not the case in private FLSA lawsuits;
while plaintiffs’ attorneys can construct litigation, plaintiffs themselves still
either have to bring the suit or affirmatively opt in to it.249 Thus, employees
would likely be more involved in a settlement than the United States would
be. Further, many plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees in FLSA cases are contingent on
the case’s outcome and thus inextricably linked to settlement amounts in
FLSA lawsuits;250 the better an attorney does advocating for his client, the
higher the settlement likely will be, resulting in higher contingent fees. But
with lawsuits brought under § 3730(b), a relator’s award is not necessarily
linked with the United States’ award. For example, a relator can bargain
away a nonmonetary award from the United States251 or have a separate
additional claim.252 Thus, decreasing the United States’ award would not
necessarily decrease the relator’s award. As a result, relators may have less
incentive to work in the United States’ best interests than FLSA plaintiffs’
attorneys have to work in their clients’ best interests. Given these
differences, it is not necessary for settlements of private FLSA lawsuits to be
approved. Even though an approval requirement is not necessary or
appropriate, these perverse incentivesin addition to the vulnerability of the
population the FLSA protects and the Act’s purposemake it clear that some
protections are required for settlements of FLSA lawsuits. Consequently,
this Note suggests implementing rigorous standards short of requiring
approval that will seek to protect plaintiffs in FLSA lawsuits from unfair
settlements.253
Finally, § 1915(g) should not be considered an applicable federal statute,
but even if it is, it is distinguishable from the FLSA. Unlike allowing for
voluntary dismissals in cases implicating § 1915(g), allowing for voluntary
dismissals of FLSA lawsuits would not lead to a procedural loophole.
Section 1915(g) would be rendered meaningless if courts were not allowed
to deny voluntary dismissals when necessary.254 In contrast, the FLSA would
not be rendered meaningless without an approval requirement. Further, the
issue arising under § 1915(g) involves notices of dismissal filed only by the

247. See supra notes 110–14 and accompanying text.
248. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2012).
249. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
250. 22A FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYERS EDITION § 52:1779, Westlaw (database updated
June 2017).
251. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
253. See infra Part III.C–E.
254. See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text.
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plaintiff.255 The issue arising under the FLSA, however, involves
stipulations of dismissals filed by all parties.256 Thus, settlements are not
implicated in issues arising under § 1915(g) as they are in issues arising under
the FLSA.
2. Prejudice
If the FLSA is not an applicable federal statute under Rule 41, parties
should be able to voluntarily dismiss FLSA lawsuits through stipulations of
dismissal.257 Even though dismissal without prejudice is the default rule
under Rule 41, parties are also allowed to dismiss their cases with prejudice
if so stipulated.258 The same should apply to parties settling FLSA lawsuits.
Despite Picerni and Cheeks,259 because the FLSA is not an applicable federal
statute, there is nothing special about it that would require FLSA lawsuits to
be voluntarily dismissed only without prejudice and not with prejudice.
C. Parties Should Be Able to Dismiss FLSA Lawsuits
Without Court Approval If the Dismissal Is
Knowing and Voluntary and of a Bona Fide Dispute
Part III.C.1 discusses the benefits the court in Lynn’s Food believed the
adversarial context of lawsuits had on negotiations of FLSA settlements. It
also explains how those benefits should preclude the need for settlements of
FLSA lawsuits to be approved. Next, Part III.C.2 examines the negative
impacts that an approval requirement for FLSA lawsuits may have on the
ability to sufficiently enforce the FLSA. Parts III.C.3 and III.C.4 then
consider how two amendments to the FLSA, the 1947 Act and the Fair Labor
Standards Amendments of 1949, lend themselves to an understanding that
Congress did not intend for settlements of FLSA lawsuits to require approval.
Based on these arguments, the holdings in Lynn’s Food and subsequent
decisions260 should be overturned. Finally, Part III.C.5 discusses the middle
ground that needs to and can be found between requiring approval of
settlements of FLSA lawsuits and allowing the parties to dismiss such
lawsuits voluntarily without any restrictions.
1. Lynn’s Food: The Importance of the Context of a Lawsuit
In holding that settlements of FLSA lawsuits have to be approved to be
enforceable, the court in Lynn’s Food gave convincing reasoning for the
opposing proposition: that settlements of FLSA lawsuits should be
enforceable even without approval.261 The court noted that private
255. See, e.g., Large v. Beckham Cty. Dist. Court, 558 Fed. App’x 827, 828 (10th Cir.
2014); Ludy v. Nelson, No. 5:13-CV-353, 2014 WL 468509, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 2014).
256. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
257. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii).
258. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 209–11 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 140–44, 227 and accompanying text.
261. Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1354 (11th Cir. 1982).
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settlements are more likely to be permissible if agreed to in the context of a
lawsuit because of the adversarial nature of lawsuits.262 This adversarial
nature helps to level the playing field between employer and employee. In a
lawsuit, the employee goes on the offensive, while in a settlement agreed to
outside of a lawsuit, a predatory employer is more likely to go on the
offensive.263
Further, the Eleventh Circuit held that private settlements are more likely
to be permissible if agreed to in the context of a lawsuit because employees
are more likely to be represented by attorneys who can protect their
interests.264 Employees represented by attorneys generally receive more
valuable settlements than unrepresented employees.265 An attorney also
better informs employees of their rights under the FLSA, so they have a
clearer sense of what they are entitled to under the Act and what they are
agreeing to if they settle.266
2. Doing Justice to the Parties
The reasons provided in Lynn’s Food are not the only reasons why
settlements of FLSA lawsuits should be enforceable without court approval.
Another reason is the longstanding public policy favoring private settlements
of lawsuits.267 Under Rule 41, parties generally have an absolute right to
dismiss a lawsuit.268 As the applicable federal statutes and rules under Rule
41 show, unless there is an explicit provision as well as a very good reason
why parties should not be able to privately settle their lawsuits, dismissing
lawsuits should be their prerogative.269 Requiring court approval for
settlement FLSA lawsuits takes that prerogative away.
Those in favor of an approval requirement in FLSA cases reason that it is
necessary to ensure workers are not taken advantage of in settlements.270 If
employers know violating the FLSA will at worst lead to a slap on the wrist
in the form of a cheap settlement, they have little incentive to stop violating
the FLSA.271 Without such incentives, employers will continue to race to the
262. Id.
263. Compare id. (involving a settlement agreed to outside of a lawsuit in which the
employer went on the offensive), with Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199
(2d Cir. 2015) (involving a settlement agreed to during a lawsuit in which the employee went
on the offensive).
264. Lynn’s Food, 679 F.2d at 1354.
265. See id.
266. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
267. See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.
268. See Wolters Kluwer Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Scivantage, 564 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2009);
Matthews v. Gaither, 902 F.2d 877, 880 (11th Cir. 1990).
269. See supra notes 84, 102–16 and accompanying text.
270. See Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199, 206 (2d Cir. 2015)
(“Examining the basis on which district courts recently rejected several proposed FLSA
settlements highlights the potential for abuse in such settlements, and underscores why judicial
approval in the FLSA setting is necessary.”); Lynn’s Food, 679 F.2d at 1354.
271. See Dees v. Hydradry, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1237 (M.D. Fla. 2010)
(“An employer who pays less than the minimum wage or who pays no overtime has no
incremental incentive to comply voluntarily with the FLSA, if, after an employee complains,
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bottom and undercut one other on wages, negatively impacting all
workers.272 By trying to protect all workers through an approval
requirement, however, courts can hurt individual plaintiffs and disincentivize
them from bringing FLSA lawsuits.273 The FLSA relies on workers to act as
private attorneys general in bringing lawsuits.274 As low wage workers,
many of these workers lack the resources to bring a lawsuit or to continue
with one if the court rejects their settlement.275 If court approval
requirements become too tedious, many workers may opt to settle privately
out of court instead of investing time, money, and effort in a lawsuit that they
may not be able to see through to the end. If this happens, the important
private attorney general role will cease to be filled as individual plaintiffs will
not find it in their interest to bring a lawsuit.
3. Implications of the 1947 Act
One argument in support of an approval requirement derives from the 1947
Act. This Act allowed all FLSA causes of action and lawsuits in which the
parties had a bona fide dispute over the compensation owed to be settled
without court approval as long as those claims and lawsuits were based on
FLSA violations prior to the 1947 Act’s passage on May 14, 1947.276 It also
allowed liquidated damages to be waived based on violations prior to May
14, 1947, even without a bona fide dispute.277 But, since the 1947 Act did
not provide guidance about how FLSA causes of action and lawsuits based
on violations after its passage could be settled, there is no current provision
to guide courts in determining whether settlements require court approval to
be enforceable.278
Those in favor of an approval requirement reason that Congress made the
1947 Act’s settlement provision applicable only to pre-1947 Act violations
to signal that further legislation would be needed to make post-1947 Act
unapproved settlements enforceable.279 However, the Martinez court
disagreed; pointing to the 1947 Act’s legislative history, the court held that
despite the 1947 Act’s retrospective application, Congress’s goal was not to
prohibit private, unapproved settlements but to leave the decision of whether
the employer privately compromises the claim for . . . an amount less than the full amount
owed under the FLSA . . . .”).
272. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
273. See Picerni v. Bilingual Seit & Preschool Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 368, 378 (E.D.N.Y.
2013) (“[B]y forcing the plaintiff to proceed when he did not want to, the Court may have
inadvertently increased the potential adverse social consequences to the plaintiff of having
brought the suit.” (citing Zhou v. Wang’s Rest., No. C 05-0279, 2007 WL 134441 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 16, 2007))), abrogated by Cheeks, 796 F.3d 199.
274. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 18, 200–01 and accompanying text.
276. 29 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2012).
277. Id. § 253(b).
278. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
279. See Zhou v. Wang’s Rest., No. C 05-0279, 2007 WL 2298046, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 8, 2007) (“[C]ongress’ failure to make any amendments that would change the nonwaivability of FLSA claims (such as by removing the date restriction from 29 U.S.C. § 253)
evinces a congressional intent that FLSA claims continue to be non-waivable.”).
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to prohibit such settlements to a “determination under other law.”280 Because
there is no such provision or “other law” requiring the approval of
settlements, the Martinez court held that unapproved settlements should be
enforceable.281 Given the explicit approval requirements in applicable
federal statutes and rules under Rule 41, the Martinez decision presents the
better understanding of the implications of the 1947 Act on whether FLSA
settlements of lawsuits need to be approved. If such settlements had to be
approved under the FLSA, there would be an explicit approval requirement
in either § 216(b) or some “other law.”
4. Implications of the
Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949
Section 216(c) of the FLSAwhich was added to the FLSA under the Fair
Labor Standards Amendments of 1949also raises questions about whether
private settlements of lawsuits need to be approved to be enforceable. This
provision states that the Secretary of Labor “is authorized” to supervise the
payment of back wages to employees.282 Those in favor of an approval
requirement note that such a provision signals that all settlements of FLSA
lawsuits and causes of action should be supervised or approved by the
DOL.283 But DOL supervision was meant only as an additional option to
employees bringing lawsuits.284 It seems unlikely, therefore, that Congress
meant to require court approval of private FLSA lawsuits when it allowed for
DOL supervision. Furthermore, since such a provision was included in
§ 216(c) but not in § 216(b), the provision governing private lawsuits, it
seems that Congress did not intend for courts to play the same or similar
supervisory role in private lawsuits.
5. Adopting the Knowing and Voluntary
and Bona Fide Dispute Provisions
Although an approval requirement is not proper, the FLSA needs
safeguards to ensure that the vulnerable population it protects will not be
exploited or taken advantage of in settlements. While a lawsuit in and of
itself can serve as a safeguard against the exploitation of employees in a
settlement given its adversarial context,285 it is not enough of a safeguard to
sufficiently protect the population the FLSA serves. The best safeguards that
280. Martinez v. Bohls Bearing Equip. Co., 361 F. Supp. 2d 608, 631 (W.D. Tex. 2005)
(emphasis added) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 80-326, at 12 (1947) (Conf. Rep.)). The quote in the
original source is “to be determined under law other than this section,” which Martinez
misquoted.
281. Id. (“Congress has not closed the doors to the settlement of disputed questions of the
[FLSA] and the Courts should not do so by judicial construction.” (quoting Atl. Co. v.
Broughton, 146 F.2d 480, 485 (5th Cir. 1944) (Waller, J., dissenting)).
282. 29 U.S.C. § 216(c).
283. See Martinez, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 626 (noting the plaintiff’s argument that Congress
intended for DOL supervision of the payment of wages to be the only way to settle FLSA
claims).
284. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 150–51 and accompanying text.
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can be adopted to provide sufficient protection without impinging on an
employee’s right to voluntarily dismiss a lawsuit under Rule 41 are a
knowing and voluntary standard and a bona fide dispute provision.
Under the knowing and voluntary standard, parties would still be able to
voluntarily dismiss an FLSA lawsuit under Rule 41 but only if the dismissal
was knowing and voluntary. Such an amendment would recognize that the
FLSA is not an applicable federal statute under Rule 41. Thus, it would also
recognize that FLSA lawsuits should be allowed to be dismissed and
privately settled without court or DOL approval. Despite allowing for
voluntary dismissals, such an amendment would still recognize that the
FLSA is a highly protective statute. This is especially true given the ADEA’s
use of a knowing and voluntary standard to protect the elderly.286 Adopting
the standard only for dismissals of lawsuits and not settlements of causes of
actionwhich would still require approval287would recognize Congress’s
intent that the FLSA be a more protective statute, at least regarding
settlements, than the ADEA.288 This is because the ADEA applies some
version of the standard to both settlements of lawsuits and causes of action.289
In addition, adopting the ADEA’s standard would be appropriate because the
ADEA’s enforcement mechanisms are modeled after the FLSA’s
enforcement mechanisms.290
With a provision requiring a bona fide dispute, parties could dismiss
lawsuits only if the dismissal was predicated on a bona fide dispute over the
number of hours worked or amount owed. Both sides of the approval debate
recognize that settlements of FLSA lawsuits and causes of action must be of
a bona fide dispute to be enforceable.291 Without a bona fide dispute
requirement, the parties would be able to settle for less than what employees
were owed. Allowing employees to settle for less than what they are owed
would violate both the letter and the spirit of the FLSA.292
D. Enforceability of Private Settlements of FLSA Causes of Action
Part III.D.1 discusses the practical concerns that exist in settlements of
causes of action but not in settlements of lawsuits. As a result of these
differences, settlements of FLSA causes of action should require approval
while settlements of FLSA lawsuits should not. Next, Part III.D.2 explains
286. See supra notes 125, 129 and accompanying text.
287. See infra Part III.D–E.
288. See supra notes 134–38 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
291. See Martin v. Spring Break ’83 Prods., LLC, 688 F.3d 247, 255 (5th Cir. 2012)
(finding that parties can privately settle FLSA claims without court or DOL approval “where
there is a bona fide dispute as to the amount of hours worked or compensation due” (emphasis
added) (quoting Martinez v. Bohls Bearing Equip. Co., 361 F. Supp. 2d 608, 631 (W.D. Tex.
2005))); Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1355 (11th Cir. 1982)
(holding that FLSA settlement requires “a stipulated judgment entered by a court which has
determined that a settlement proposed by an employer and employees, in a suit brought by the
employees under the FLSA, is a fair and reasonable resulution [sic] of a bona fide dispute over
FLSA provisions” (emphasis added)); see also supra note 231 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 52–54, 159–60 and accompanying text.
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how the FLSA’s enforcement provisions lead to the conclusion that
settlements of causes of action require approval. Part III.D.3 then examines
how the differences between FLSA’s treatment of settlements of causes of
action and other federal employment statutes’ treatment of settlements of
causes of action lead to the conclusion that settlements of FLSA causes of
action require approval. Based on these determinations, the holdings in
Martin and Martinez should be overturned.293 Finally, Part III.D.4 suggests
additional measures that should be taken regarding settling FLSA causes of
action.
1. Practical Concerns Regarding Private Settlements
of FLSA Causes of Action
There are practical concerns about private settlements of FLSA causes of
action that do not exist for FLSA lawsuits. The biggest concern is predatory
employers taking advantage of uninformed, unrepresented employees.294 In
settlements of causes of action, employers usually reach out to employees,
while in lawsuits, employees sue employers.295 As a result, employees are
more likely to be passive bystanders in a settlement of a cause of action than
in a settlement of a lawsuit. Further, the benefits of a lawsuit’s adversarial
context that are pivotal to negotiating a fair settlement are lost in the
settlement of a cause of action.296 Lynn’s Food’s facts provide a glaring
example of this.297 Had the employees in that case been able to bring a
lawsuit, they would have learned about the DOL’s finding of FLSA
violations and could have been represented by an attorney. Given the case’s
egregious facts and the DOL’s previous finding, the employees likely would
have been paid what they were owed under the FLSA rather than settling for
much less. Given these facts, it is clear that in settlements of causes of action,
employees are unable to adequately assert their rights against employers in a
setting that levels the playing field or have their interests properly
represented. Thus, unapproved settlements of causes of action should not be
allowed.
One counterargument against differentiating between settlements of
lawsuits and settlements of causes of action is that in some settlements of
causes of action, employees may be represented either by a union
representative or by an attorney.298 In such cases, having representation
arguably helps to achieve the benefits of an adversarial context.
Attorney representation is far from the only benefit a lawsuit confers on
plaintiffs. Lawsuits have the ability to put unequal parties on an equal
plane.299 The threat of going to trial and obtaining a judgment in a lawsuit
293. See supra notes 159, 171 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
295. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 150–51 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text.
298. See, e.g., Martin v. Spring Break ’83 Prods., LLC, 688 F.3d 247, 249 (5th Cir. 2012).
299. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076–78 (1984); see also
supra note 263 and accompanying text.
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from an impartial adjudicator can help to erase the disparities in resources
between the parties that can influence a settlement in favor of the
employer.300 Such a threat could make employers more responsive to the
facts and merits of a case than their own bargaining power. Further, lawsuits
avail plaintiffs of the ability to engage in discovery.301 Engaging in discovery
can give plaintiffs a better sense of the merits of their case and access to more
information that can be helpful in negotiating a settlement or deciding
whether to go to trial.302
Thus, the reason settlements of causes of action, but not lawsuits, should
require approval is twofold. First, as a result of the benefits litigation confers
on plaintiffs, employees that bring lawsuits need less protection in
negotiating settlements than employees who settle causes of action. Second,
requiring approval for settlements of causes of action, but not lawsuits,
encourages employees to pursue litigation and thereby obtain its benefits.
This helps level the playing field with employers and lessen the inequities of
bargaining power inherent in the employee-employer relationship.
2. Implications of the FLSA’s Enforcement Provisions
The FLSA’s enforcement provisions provide further reasoning for why
settlements of causes of action, but not settlements of lawsuits, should have
to be approved. The FLSA gives employees three options to pursue when
seeking to recover unpaid wages or compensation: (1) bring a lawsuit against
your employer, (2) have the Secretary of Labor bring a lawsuit against your
employer on your behalf, or (3) have the Secretary of Labor supervise the
payment of unpaid wages or compensation.303 There is no provision
allowing employees to settle their causes of action under the FLSA without
supervision. In fact, the supervision option in § 216(c) implies that if
employees settle their claims outside of a lawsuit, the settlement must be
approved to be enforceable.304 While there is no explicit provision in
§ 216(b) that lawsuits can be settled without court approval, the FLSA allows
such settlements when read in tandem with Rule 41. Because there is no
option under the FLSA for employees to settle their causes of action in an
unapproved agreement with their employers, such an agreement should not
be enforceable.
3. The FLSA Is Different from Other Employment Statutes
The conclusion that settlements of FLSA causes of action must be
approved by the court or DOL to be enforceable is further supported by the
300. See Fiss, supra note 299, at 1077, 1080–81.
301. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37.
302. See Bruce L. Hay, Civil Discovery: Its Effects and Optimal Scope, 23 J. LEGAL STUD.
481, 481–82 (1994).
303. See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text.
304. See Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1352–53 (11th Cir.
1982) (holding that besides settling a lawsuit, the only other way to settle FLSA claims is
under 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) through the supervised payment by the DOL of unpaid wages to
employees).
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FLSA’s status as the only federal employment statute considered in this Note
for which both Congress and the courts have refused to allow or uphold
private settlements of causes of action. The FLSA, unlike the ADEA305 and
FMLA,306 has no provision regarding the private settlement of causes of
action. And unlike Title VII’s case law,307 most of the FLSA’s case law does
not allow unapproved settlements of causes of action to be enforceable.308
The FLSA’s characteristics also call for it to be treated differently than
other federal employment statutes. The ADEA, FMLA, and Title VII are all
employment statutes concerning discrimination. Their cases, therefore, often
involve nuanced issues of fact that are more difficult to determine than the
issues of fact that arise in FLSA cases.309 Accordingly, fair settlements of
ADEA, FMLA, and Title VII claims are harder to determine than FLSA
claims.310 Further, the ADEA, FMLA, and Title VII do not protect
populations as vulnerable to exploitation as the population protected by the
FLSA.311 The FLSA seeks to protect the lowest class of workers who are
being paid below a living wage.312 While those being discriminated against
for taking medical leave or on the basis of their race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin may also be vulnerable, the FMLA and Title VII apply
generally to all employees.313 The ADEA does target a vulnerable
population—the elderly.314 But because the ADEA protects elderly
employees of all incomes, at least some elderly people have better resources
to protect themselves against exploitation than the low wage workers
protected by the FLSA.315
Congress and the courts have had ample opportunity to allow private
settlements of FLSA causes of action. They have acknowledged as much
when allowing private settlements of causes of action under other federal
employment statutes.316 However, they have continued to differentiate the
FLSA from these statutes by requiring settlements of FLSA causes of action
be approved. The same can be said about Congress’s and the courts’
treatment of the approval of settlements of FLSA lawsuits. However, the
difference is that if Rule 41 does not explicitly require approval of lawsuit
settlements, the assumption is that lawsuits can be voluntarily dismissed
without approval. But with federal employment statutes, if there is no
explicit provision or case law, then it should be assumed that settlements
must be approved to be enforceable. Just as the FLSA’s lack of an express
approval requirement provision indicates that it is not an applicable federal
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306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1) (2012).
See 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) (2013).
See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 n.15 (1974).
See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 135–37 and accompanying text.
See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 122–25 and accompanying text.
See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 132–33 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 125, 138 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 134–38 and accompanying text.
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statute, the FLSA’s lack of a provision or case law supporting the ability to
settle causes of action without approval indicates that such a provision was
not intended.
Given these differences, the FLSA should not follow the ADEA, FMLA,
and Title VII in allowing causes of action to be privately settled without
approval.
4. Adopting the Bona Fide Dispute Provision
Settlement of FLSA causes of action should require a bona fide dispute in
addition to approval by the DOL or the courts. Both sides of the approval
debate agree that settlements of FLSA lawsuits and causes of action must be
of a bona fide dispute to be allowed, and without a bona fide dispute
requirement, the parties would be able to settle for less than what employees
were owed, which would violate both the letter and the spirit of the FLSA.317
E. Congress Needs to Take Action
To implement the decisions mentioned above,318 Congress needs to amend
29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The following provisions should be added:
(1)

Parties to lawsuits brought under this subsection may dismiss such
lawsuits with or without prejudice through stipulated dismissals
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) without the
approval of a district court or the Secretary of Labor if such
dismissals are knowing and voluntary and a bona fide dispute exists
over the number of hours worked or compensation owed. A
dismissal may not be considered knowing and voluntary unless, at a
minimum
(a)

the dismissal is part of an agreement between the individual
and the employer that is written in a manner calculated to be
understood by such individual or by the average individual
eligible to participate;

(b)

the dismissal specifically refers to rights or claims arising
under this chapter;

(c)

the individual does not waive rights or claims that may arise
after the date the waiver is executed;

(d)

the individual waives rights or claims only in exchange for
consideration in addition to anything of value to which the
individual already is entitled;

(e)

the individual is advised in writing to consult with an
attorney prior to executing the agreement; and

317. See supra Part III.C.5.
318. See supra Part III.B–D.
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the individual is given a reasonable period of time within
which to consider the settlement agreement.

Waiver of any cause of action arising under section 206 or 207 shall
not be enforceable without the existence of a bona fide dispute over
the number of hours worked or compensation owed and the approval
of a district court or the Secretary of Labor.

As a result of this new statute, private unapproved settlements of FLSA
claims would be allowed only as settlements of lawsuits and not as
settlements of causes of action. If an employee sues his employer under the
FLSA, the parties should be allowed to settle their lawsuit without approval
and with or without prejudice as long as the settlement is entered into
knowingly and voluntarily and is of a bona fide dispute. But a private
settlement obtained outside the adversarial context of a lawsuit should not be
enforceable unless it is of a bona fide dispute and made with court or DOL
approval.
CONCLUSION
The FLSA is a uniquely protective statute319 and there are some
convincing arguments for why it should be considered an applicable federal
statute under Rule 41.320 However, it is clear that applicable federal statutes
must have an explicit approval requirement to be considered exempt from
Rule 41’s voluntary dismissal provision.321 Since the FLSA lacks such an
explicit approval requirement, it cannot be considered an applicable federal
statute under Rule 41.322 The FLSA should not be amended to include such
a provision because an approval requirement is neither necessary nor proper
for FLSA lawsuits.323 Even though the FLSA is not an applicable federal
statute under Rule 41, it is a highly protective statute and should be treated
as such. Thus, the FLSA should adopt the ADEA’s knowing and voluntary
standard and a bona fide dispute requirement to apply to the dismissal of
lawsuits.324 Even though FLSA lawsuits should be allowed to be dismissed
without court or DOL approval, FLSA causes of action should not be.325
There are too many dangers involved in allowing parties to settle outside the
adversarial context of a lawsuit. These dangers dictate that courts or the DOL
must approve settlements of causes of action and that these settlements must
be of a bona fide dispute to effectively accomplish the goals of the FLSA.326
To put these rules into effect, Congress must amend the FLSA.327
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